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ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Firms face critical challenges in managing product quality in a global supply chain. 
In many cases, these challenges could be regarded as an agency problem which is a result of 
the goal conflict between the supply chain members. To address such agency problem, the 
purposes of this study are to explain how risk and reward sharing practices contribute to firms’ 
quality performance in the supply chain, and to identify the drivers of applying risk and reward 
sharing. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The hypothesised model, based on agency theory, is 
empirically verified by original survey data of 200 Chinese manufacturing companies using 
the structural equations modelling approach in a context of product recall.     
Findings: Supplier involvement and task programmability are two significant antecedents of 
risk and reward sharing. Further, the paper shows that risk and reward sharing have a positive 
effect on quality performance however in terms of contribution to quality performance, risk 
sharing and reward sharing may be substitution practices. 
Practical Implications: This research explains how managers could embrace better 
preparedness for risk and reward sharing in their supply chains. It is also suggested that 
although risk and reward sharing are seen as efficient means to improve quality performance, 
such practices should not be treated as a bundle.  
Originality/Value: Building on supply partnership literature, this paper contributes to agency 
theory by providing a solution to the agency problem i.e., risk and reward sharing and adding 
to the limited understanding of the antecedents of risk and reward sharing and examining the 
effects of risk and reward sharing on quality performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few years the supply chain environment has become ever more complicated, 
making it more difficult to sustain quality performance, especially in suppliers’ performance 
(Lyles et al., 2008). To enhance quality assurance in the supply chain, many companies have 
established supply chain partnership (SCP) strategies. Recent literature has cited the 
importance of SCP to deal with quality uncertainty in the supply network (Mellat-Parast, 2015). 
Drawing from the key components of the SCP model (Lambert et al., 1996), this study 
investigates the strategic roles of risk sharing and reward sharing in addressing the quality 
issues underpinned by agency problems that are inherent in the supply chain.  
 
The literature argues that risk sharing is an appropriate method to mitigate the risk in the supply 
chain (Camuffo et al., 2007; Fan et al., 2016). Risk sharing practice could also be ideal for 
mitigating the quality issues raised in the supply chain. For example, where there is an 
appropriate recall cost sharing agreement, the focal firm and their suppliers can share the recall 
operation cost without either firm carrying the entire burden. Therefore, both parties can avoid 
the destructive consequences of a quality crisis. In supply chain management (SCM) literature, 
risk sharing refers to a type of supply chain risk management (SCRM) activity (Norrman and 
Jansson, 2004; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008); it is used to deal with unpredicted uncertainty in 
upstream supply risk in order to reduce loss in transaction (Camuffo et al., 2007). Reward 
sharing often intertwines with risk sharing, since benefit is taken as an incentive to both parties 
to mitigate the supply chain risk together (Harland et al., 2004). As an incentive mechanism 
approach aimed at cost-saving and improving product quality, reward sharing practice is 
helpful for achieving better firm performance when, for instance, a supplier incentivised by a 
cash refund from the buying firm might be more willing to improve effectiveness and guarantee 
the product quality (Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002). 
 
Given that risk and reward sharing deal with the collaboration issues between the focal 
company and its suppliers (Eisenhardt, 1989), we argue that agency theory is an appropriate 
theoretical lens to investigate the risk and reward sharing practices. Scholars have made 
meticulous efforts to examine quality issues in the supply chain through the lens of agency 
theory in OM (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). For example, researchers have drawn on the 
perspective of agency theory to understand the governance mechanisms for improving supply 
 
 
 
chain effectiveness and the nature of the supply chain quality problem (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). 
This supply chain quality problem can be explained by the agent’s opportunistic behaviour; for 
example, the supplier may cut corners by using lower grade components, and eventually this 
may lead to a serious product recall scandal, such as the Kobe steel recall in 2017 (Masumi and 
Chikako, 2017).  
 
In the existing SCM literature, there are two trends of studying the agency problems. First, 
some studies tend to focus on discussing the antecedents (Steinle et al., 2014) and the 
consequences of agency problems (Yan and Kull, 2015). Second, another trend is to identify 
practices to manage the agency problems (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). 
For the second stream, a proposed solution is to form SCP, in which risk and reward sharing 
are two key constructs in the SCP model. Although existing literature have included risk and 
reward sharing in SCM frameworks such as, Mentzer et al. (2001), to date the antecedents of 
risk and reward sharing have not been fully scrutinised. According to the agency theory, 
collaboration characterised by low information asymmetry and high task programmability 
would be beneficial to the implementation of behaviour-based management techniques, such 
as risk sharing and reward sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003; Li et al., 2015). 
Drawing from the agency theory, we propose task programmability and supplier involvement 
as two pivotal factors that affect both risk and reward sharing.  
 
First, we argue that supplier involvement, which guaranteed good communication between the 
focal company and its supplier, could be a significant driver of implementing both risk and 
reward sharing. Harland et al. (2004) stress that an open dialogue is needed to agree on the 
allocation of risk between two parties. According to Yan and Kull (2015), supplier involvement 
can help to reduce the information asymmetry between the focal company and its supplier. 
Although supply chain researchers have shown great interest in supplier involvement, most 
related research focuses on its effect on firm performance (Carr and Pearson, 2002; Parker et 
al., 2008), with limited attention paid to the association between supplier involvement and risk 
and reward sharing mechanism.  
 
Second, by enhancing the observability of supplier’s task, we propose task programmability 
would be positively associated with the adoption of risk and reward sharing. The literature 
suggests that the higher the specification in advance of appropriate agent behaviour (i.e., high 
 
 
 
task programmability), the more easily the principal can assess and observe the behaviour of 
its agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The recent SCM research places great emphasis on the importance 
of using agency theory to investigate the relationship between buying companies and their 
suppliers (Zu and Kaynak, 2012; Li et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there has been only limited 
research to examine the role of task programmability in the implementation of SCM practices. 
Zu and Kaynak (2012) establish a proposition that when perceiving high task programmability 
of suppliers, buying firms tend to rely on the behaviour-based management practices. Zsidisin 
and Smith (2005) propose that buying companies can reduce supplier failures through 
programming and monitoring supplier task and accomplishment. However, previous studies 
have not empirically verified the theoretical propositions with a large-scale sample.  
 
In this study, we develop a theoretical framework to help both practitioners and academics to 
devise strategies that will increase the efficiency of risk and reward sharing, and to promote 
quality performance by adopting risk and reward sharing practices. This paper aims to fill the 
current research gap by examining the following research questions (RQs): 
 
RQ1: What are the antecedent factors motivating focal companies to adopt risk and reward 
sharing practices with an ultimate aim to improve quality performance? 
RQ2: How do risk and reward sharing practices influence focal companies' quality 
performance? 
 
To answer these two research questions, the SCP model is applied to explain the rationales of 
how the antecedent factors impact on risk and reward sharing, and how the quality performance 
is influenced by risk and reward sharing. We synthesise the findings from the literature to 
propose a risk and reward sharing conceptual model and then test it in the context of product 
recalls in China. This research focuses on China because it is the world’s second-largest 
economy, has been the manufacturing centre of the world for the past three decades and has 
been involved in many high-profile product recall incidents (Jia and Rutherford, 
2010). Moreover, the increasing number of product harm incidents in China indicates an urgent 
need to identify efficient management practices that will help companies to improve quality 
performance (Tse and Tan, 2012). Although China has been widely regarded as an ideal setting 
to research risk management or SCM, very few researches have explored the risk and reward 
sharing practices in this context. In order to fill this gap, our proposed model is tested with a 
 
 
 
sample of 200 Chinese manufacturing companies.  
 
This rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a literature review 
of risk and reward sharing and theoretical background of agency theory. The third section 
develops the hypotheses. The fourth section describes the characteristics of our collected 
sample and justifies the measurements of the theoretical constructs. The model testing is 
addressed in the fifth section and a discussion of the results is provided in the sixth section. 
Finally, the seventh section provides theoretical and practical contributions, describes 
limitation of this study and suggests the future research directions. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Risk sharing and reward sharing 
Risk management activities include avoidance, reduction, transfer, sharing or even taking the 
risk (Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008) in order to reduce the probability 
and consequences of the incident (Norrman and Jansson, 2004). The use of pre-crisis 
agreements and improving collaboration can mitigate risks in a supply chain relationship. For 
example, buying firms might use contractual agreements which clarify the shared responsibility 
for managing external product failure costs to induce efforts on quality improvement (Chao et 
al., 2009). Drawing from the SCP model, risk and reward sharing are regarded as the key 
components to make the supply chain relationship operational and help practitioners to obtain 
the benefits of partnership (Lambert et al., 1996; Jia and Lamming, 2013). According to 
Lambert et al. (1996), risk and reward sharing are crucial; it is necessary to ensure that both 
the benefits and costs of partnering are shared, because “shared destiny” is the core of a SCP.  
 
In this study, risk sharing “pertains to the situation in which a firm aligns the obligations 
among supply chain members regarding how they share the duties to mitigate SCRs and face 
the consequences of SCRs in their supply chain” (Li et al., 2015: P84).  Reward sharing refers 
to an incentive mechanism in which the buyer and the supplier share the bonus, cost savings 
and business opportunities from product development and cooperating activities that improve 
the manufacturing process (Cousins, 2005). 
 
The adoption of risk and reward sharing is critical for company to manage supply chain risks 
 
 
 
(SCRs). According to Christopher (2000), today’s businesses no longer compete as stand-alone 
entities; rather, companies need to compete as supply chains. This brings more challenges and 
complexity for managers to manage risks, as these risks will affect the whole supply chain 
rather than a single company. For companies competing in emerging markets such as China, 
the highly uncertain environment raises further the barriers regarding the management of SCRs 
(Tse et al., 2016).  Furthermore, although incentives for the excellent performance of business 
partners can be helpful to reduce the SCRs, incentive schemes in the supply chain are invariably 
badly designed (Narayanan and Raman, 2004). It can be argued that both the highly uncertain 
environment and the blurring of boundaries between supply chain members contribute to the 
high level of difficulty in clarifying responsibilities and rewards during the supply chain 
cooperation (Li et al., 2015).  
 
Although many researchers have recognised the importance of the risk sharing mechanism in 
the supply chain context, most of them treat it as a unidirectional approach conducted by the 
buyer, whereby the buyer absorbs the risks from the supplier. Echoing Zsidisin and Ellram 
(2003), who consider SCRs as a multidimensional concept, we examine risk sharing in a 
bidirectional way, in which both buyers and suppliers absorb risks from each other. We argue 
that the risk sharing mechanism can be achieved through establishing the contractual 
mechanism and through improved collaborations. According to Kim et al. (2010), the 
reciprocal risk sharing mechanism could help to maintain the cooperative relationship between 
the supply chain members. The risk sharing mechanism, which focuses on aligning the 
responsibilities and coordinating the behaviour of supply chain partners, is found to be more 
effective than single-firm focused risk management strategies (such as flexibility, buffering 
and postponement) (Fan et al., 2017). Through specifying the responsibilities and obligations, 
the partnering companies would share a unified goal of mitigating the SCRs. 
 
As a soft side of risk sharing mechanism, the role of reward sharing should not be ignored. 
Unlike risk sharing, which focuses on obligations and responsibilities, reward sharing is to do 
with the alignment of incentives between supply chain partners. Incentive alignment is a 
mechanism “establishing the contracts that make the agent’s compensation contingent on 
outcomes of his or her performance that are desired by the principal” (Tosi et al., 1997, p.588). 
Ramanathan et al. (2011) indicate that incentive sharing is an important enhancer of supply 
chain collaboration. In this regard, reward sharing could be seen as an incentive mechanism 
 
 
 
that enhances the commitment of the supplier in collaborative projects and reduces the impact 
of conflict problems (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2008). For instance, the buying firm could 
provide the supplier with a cash refund equal to a portion of the cost saved when the supplier 
improves the accuracy of production or successfully collaborates with the buyer in product 
development projects. According to Radhakrishnan et al. (2012), the incentive sharing system 
can ensure that there is an equitable distribution of benefits so as to sustain the motivation for 
the business partners to participate in the collaborative project. Drawing on the case of British 
Petroleum’s (BP) Andrew Alliance, Barlow (2000) finds that the importance of gain sharing 
(i.e., reward sharing) should not be underestimated, as “it resulted in innovation, which 
reduced contractors' time input and therefore, their remuneration” (p. 984).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 provides a comprehensive revision of the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
of risk and reward sharing. Although there is a growing interest in studying risk and reward 
sharing mechanisms, there has been little empirical examination of their antecedents and 
consequences. With regard to the consequences of applying risk sharing practices, Li et al. 
(2015) empirically examine the association between risk sharing mechanisms and financial 
performance. They argue that the effect of risk sharing on financial performance is 
strengthened by a shared understanding of SCRM. More recently, Fan et al. (2017) 
comprehensively propose and test the linkage of risk sharing with its antecedents and 
consequences. The factors of risk information sharing and risk analysis and assessment are 
found to be the significant drivers of the risk sharing mechanism (Fan et al., 2017). 
Additionally, building on the research of Li et al. (2015), Fan et al. (2017) argue that risk 
sharing mechanisms can enhance firms’ operational performance. However, while these 
empirical studies have started to examine the antecedents and consequences of the risk sharing 
mechanism, there remain at least two research gaps associated with this issue. First, the effect 
of risk sharing on firm’s quality performance is not examined in the literature. Second, its 
relationship with supplier involvement and task programmability has not attracted researchers’ 
interest.  
 
It is surprising that very few attempts have been made to operationalise individually the soft 
side of risk sharing, that is reward sharing, or to examine the antecedents and consequences of 
 
 
 
reward sharing. As shown in Table 1, the measurement of reward sharing is often mixed with 
that of risk sharing (or incentive alignment). Min and Mentzer (2004) measure the reward 
sharing in combination with risk sharing through a first order factor of SCM. Likewise, Min et 
al. (2007) operationalise the risk and reward sharing as a sub-dimension of SCM. The risk and 
reward sharing are also measured as a single item (i.e., single question) for measuring the 
supply chain collaboration (Cao et al., 2010) and relationship outcome (Cousins and Lawson, 
2007). The SCM literature also conceptualises the risk and reward sharing mechanism as a 
construct of incentive alignment, which focuses on both cost and benefit sharing (Wiengarten 
et al., 2010; Zhang and Cao, 2018). Although reward sharing has been discussed by authors of 
SCP, we argue that the empirical research of investigating the reward sharing is insufficient. 
The antecedents and outcomes of reward sharing have still not been revealed. To fill the 
research gaps, we draw on the agency theory to examine two proposed antecedents of reward 
sharing: supplier involvement and task programmability.  
 
2.2. Agency theory 
The agency theory focuses on a situation where one party appoints a second party to act on its 
behalf, also known as the principal-agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). 
Specifically, in the context of the supply chain, the buyer can be regarded as the principal, who 
delegates the production of tangible products or service to the supplier (i.e. agent). Therefore, 
according to agency theory, both buying firms and suppliers are involved in the agency 
relationship (Zu and Kaynak, 2012).  
 
Information asymmetry indicates a situation where one party has less or worse information 
than the other. The information asymmetry might encourage suppliers to exert opportunistic 
behaviour (Ekanayake, 2004; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). For instance, moral hazard is a problem 
related to agent’s opportunistic behaviour in the situation of “incomplete information”. Few 
people will deny that it is expensive and difficult for the buyers to constantly monitor the 
manufacturing process of suppliers. In the context of SCM, moral hazard arises when the 
suppliers do not keep promise in product quality improvement and even cheat in supply product 
quality (i.e., a lack of effort on the part of agent) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zu and Kaynak, 2012). We 
argue that through aligning and specifying the responsibilities and incentives, the risk and 
reward sharing mechanisms could help to reduce the harms associated with this agency 
 
 
 
problem. Although agency problem can never be entirely removed, using risk and reward 
sharing practices to unify the organisational interest could point the way to solving the agency 
problems in supply chains. 
 
In accordance with Eisenhardt (1989) propositions, SCM researchers have paid considerable 
attention to proposing and verifying methods to solve the agency problems.  These methods 
are generally summarised as behavioural-based mechanisms and outcome-based mechanisms. 
For example, Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) categorise SCRM as buffer-based management 
practices and behaviour-based practices. Specifically, the outcome-oriented practices aim at 
reducing the negative impact of the SCRs, while the behaviour-oriented practices aim at 
controlling supplier processes (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). The risk and reward sharing 
mechanisms can be regarded as behaviour-based practices, which are directly relevant to the 
agency theory because they are concerned with the process of sharing the duties and 
consequences of business partnering  (Li et al., 2015).  
 
Furthermore, in the research of Zsidisin and Ellram (2003), we can find similar arguments to 
support our notion. The nature of target costing, which is classified by Zsidisin and Ellram 
(2003) as a behaviour-based approach to risk management, is matched with the concept of risk 
and reward sharing mechanism (Scott, 2001). Zsidisin and Ellram (2003) argue that the 
development of target costing with the supplier requires extensive communication between the 
buyer and supplier to “drive cost out”, which “closely aligns the goals of the supplier with 
those of purchasing companies” (p. 18).  As indicated by Ellis (2003), it is crucial that the 
agency relationship is structured with an appropriate mix of incentives and penalties, thus 
motivating the agent to perform the delegated task in line with the principal’s interests. 
 
Although behaviour-based practices can offer potential long-term benefits for the company, 
success in implementing those practices requires substantial investment and adequate 
information from the agent (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). The logic behind this is that the behaviour-
based practices, such as the risk and reward sharing mechanism, aim to improve the supplier’s 
performance by focusing on the process rather than the outcomes (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). 
Therefore, buying companies’ ability to observe the behaviour of their suppliers determines the 
efficiency of conducting the risk and reward sharing. We propose that, through enhancing the 
observability of suppliers’ behaviour, supplier involvement and task programmability would 
 
 
 
be two significant drivers of implementing risk and reward sharing. 
 
Agency theory proposes that behaviour-based practices would be more effective when the 
company has lower information asymmetry and higher task programmability (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). According to Zu and Kaynak (2012), in the situation of low 
information asymmetry buyers would be more amenable to investing in the behaviour-based 
practices. Supplier involvement, which allows buyers to better verify the supplier’s behaviour 
and to clearly understand the supplier's technological expertise (Zsidisin and Smith, 2005), can 
lower the information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers (Yan and Kull, 2015). 
Accordingly, based on the proposition of agency theory, we expect that higher supplier 
involvement could help companies to achieve more efficient risk and reward sharing 
mechanisms.  
 
Task programmability, which refers to the degree to which the supplier’s appropriate behaviour 
can be specified by the buyer in advance (Mahaney and Lederer, 2003), is another proposed 
antecedent of risk and reward sharing derived from the agency theory. Zsidisin and Ellram 
(2003) indicate that the success of behaviour-based practices requires the principal to have the 
ability to assess and observe the agent. Because high task programmability implies that the 
production process and information from the suppliers are standardised, the assessment and 
evaluation of the suppliers’ abilities should be more efficient. Therefore, we argue, the more 
programmable the tasks that are delegated to the suppliers, the easier it should be for buyers to 
establish effective risk and reward sharing mechanisms.  
 
Although forming SCP in the form of risk sharing and reward sharing is considered implicitly 
as a solution to the agency problem, we have not yet seen a comprehensive conceptual 
framework explaining the detailed mechanisms. According to our theoretical foundation, a 
conceptual model is developed as presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 About Here 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
Given that risk sharing requires close coordination among buyers and suppliers, all supply 
chain partners should share an understanding of the supply chain vulnerabilities (Revilla and 
Saenz, 2017). Supplier involvement has been widely regarded as a critical practice to reduce 
 
 
 
product design error and improve the cost-efficiency of production (Chang et al., 2006). If 
suppliers are involved early in the manufacturing or design process, buyers can obtain more 
information about the manufacturing process; hence, both buyers and suppliers can promote 
better resource utilisation, and the development and sharing of technological expertise (Birou 
and Fawcett, 1994). Zsidisin and Smith (2005) suggest that supplier involvement enables 
buyers to better monitor their suppliers’ behaviour and activities. We argue that a high level of 
supplier involvement promotes better understanding of the supplier’s capacity, which in turn 
helps to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the risk sharing.  
 
In addition, supplier involvement in product development projects can be set up to encourage 
both parties in an agency relationship to investigate cost-saving ideas (e.g., new product design 
and production problem solutions) (Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002), which in turn motivate the 
reward sharing mechanism. As an example, the automobile manufacturer Fiat rewarded its 
suppliers for their suggestions with a cash refund equal to 50 percent of the cost saved during 
the first year of applicability (Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002). The saving of cost can be considered 
as a reward shared between buyers and suppliers. Moreover, according to Tosi et al. (1997), 
when the principal can accurately assess the agent’s behaviour and obtain the agent’s 
information, the agent’s compensations can be designed in ways that align the interests of both 
agents and principals. Given that involving the supplier in the product development project 
makes it easier for the buyer to obtain and monitor the supplier’s behaviour and information, 
the effectiveness of the reward sharing mechanism can be improved. In this regard, we propose: 
H1a: High level supplier involvement motivates buyers to implement risk sharing. 
H1b: High level supplier involvement motivates buyers to implement reward sharing. 
 
The second set of hypotheses examines the relationships among task programmability, and risk 
and reward sharing practices. In buyer-supplier relationships, the programmable tasks refer to 
all supplier activities and sequences fully specified by standard operating procedures. From the 
perspective of agency theory, establishing the programmable tasks allows the principal to 
specify the behaviours that the agent needs to perform (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ekanayake, 2004). 
The buying companies can monitor suppliers’ operations by keeping track of the documents or 
statistical process control data of each manufacturing task as they are sent back from the 
supplier (Aron et al., 2008). Therefore, we argue that an organisation with high task 
 
 
 
programmability can investigate the production data in each task, then clearly and fairly 
allocate the responsibility for any failure and loss.  
 
In the context of the buyer-supplier relationship, the buying companies concentrates primarily 
on the development and implementation of performance measures (Melnyk et al., 2004), 
including behaviour-related performance measures, information systems and other control 
systems to monitor and manage the interface with its agents (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to 
Camuffo et al. (2007), task programmability can help to reduce the information asymmetry. A 
high level of task programmability, where the buyer specifies in advance what will constitute 
appropriate behaviour on the part of the supplier, means that the buyer can allocate appropriate 
rewards to the supplier based on its performance. Therefore, higher levels of task 
programmability enable better implementation of reward sharing. Hence, we hypothesise: 
H2a: High levels of task programmability result in high levels of risk sharing practice. 
H2b: High levels of task programmability result in high levels of reward sharing practice. 
 
Quality performance refers to the degree to which manufacturers consistently achieve 
conformance to specifications and fitness for use (Kristal et al., 2010). As an agency problem 
in the supply chain relationship, moral hazard refers to the situation where  
suppliers exert less effort than expected with regard to the product quality improvement (Zu 
and Kaynak, 2012).  In the context of SCM, moral hazard represents a great challenge that must 
be overcome in order to ensure the quality performance (Steven and Britto, 2016). We argue 
that risk sharing can help supply chain partners to make shared understanding of the potential 
consequences of product quality failure. Such shared understanding of the quality risk is related 
to the perception of risk, which guides the decision making (Ellis et al., 2010). Therefore, when 
enacting the mechanisms for reducing the harms of quality risk, a shared understanding of 
product quality issues is important (Ellis et al., 2011; Revilla and Saenz, 2017). If the supplier 
realises the consequences and costs of product quality failure, the likelihood of moral hazard 
will be decreased and will result in better quality performance. Previous research also suggests 
that the risk sharing mechanism can significantly contribute to firm’s performance through 
resolving the conflicting objectives between buyers and suppliers, better anticipating and 
coordinating the supply and demand, and allocating costs related with the quality risks more 
appropriately (Li et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2017).  
 
 
 
 
To ensure that agents do not engage in behaviour that would lead to moral hazard, but act 
according to the mutual interest of both parties, the principal needs to increase incentives for 
the achievement made by the agent (Ekanayake, 2004). We argue that reward sharing could 
help to mitigate the threat of moral hazard by creating a mutual goal and providing expected 
incentives for improving product quality. This argument is supported by the agency theory that 
aligning incentives and goals can help to address the moral hazard problem faced by the 
principal (Chao, 2011). According to Nyaga et al. (2013), when a partner offers a reward to 
other partners in a supply chain relationship, it is likely to encourage more positive perceptions 
on the part of those who receive the rewards or benefits and result in closer relationships and 
better performance. Moreover, the reward sharing mechanism can be seen as a motivator of the 
buyer-supplier relationship by enhancing the notion of reciprocity, which means that the 
recipient of the reward will feel obligated to satisfy the expectation of the reward dispenser 
(Nyaga et al., 2013). To ensure the continuous rewards, the firm must keep collaborating with 
its partners and continue to improve product quality. Thus, we hypothesise: 
H3a: Risk sharing practice positively affects quality performance. 
H3b: Reward sharing practice positively affects quality performance. 
 
Researchers view the risk and reward sharing function as a bilateral practice that can improve 
the firm’s performance (Min et al., 2007). Narasimhan et al. (2013) suggest that risk and reward 
sharing have a visible financial impact on supply relationships, and is a major factor that can 
mitigate opportunistic behaviour of suppliers. The risk and reward sharing can serve jointly to 
shift risk to the agent (Handley and Angst, 2015). Specifically, reward sharing is the practice 
that promotes excellent performance, while risk sharing demotivates suppliers away from poor 
performance. When the rewards and punishments for a mission are clearly specified, the 
benefits derived from accomplishing the specific task outweigh the net costs of not doing so. 
In other words, an agent that has entered into an agreement in which undesired operations 
attract punishment, may perceive the rewards provided by the principal as having more value 
than would an agent who has not entered into such an agreement. Therefore, there is a 
complementary relationship between the risk and reward sharing. Matopoulos et al. (2007) 
argue that it is critical to balance the risk and reward sharing to enhance the collaboration 
attitude of both parties to avoid supply chain failures.  
 
 
 
 
Xu and Beamon (2006) indicate that if the risk and reward sharing is under the fair condition, 
the risk costs (such as coordination cost, opportunistic risk cost and operational cost) will be 
reduced. Suppliers that agree to share more risk with the buyers will be guaranteed to receive 
more benefits from the buyer-supplier relationship. If the suppliers agree to share the risks 
related to the product quality, the focal company will be free from certain costs; for example, 
they will be able to reduce the time spent on supplier quality inspection. In this case, the 
suppliers could receive a guarantee from the focal company that it will receive more benefits 
during or after the transaction. This can be regarded as a complementary effect of implementing 
both risk and reward sharing practices that clearly specify the reward and punishment at the 
same time. Moreover, Meng and Gallagher (2012) find that incentives combined with 
disincentives have more effect on project performance. We therefore argue that the perceived 
value of rewards for quality improvement can be strengthened by informing the partners of the 
punishment (i.e., risk sharing) and sharing the norms of jointly handling the quality failures 
(i.e., net cost).  Thus, we hypothesise: 
H4: The quality performance is stronger when risk and reward sharing are used jointly 
than when they are used separately. 
 
4. Method 
4.1 Data collection  
The target population for our study consisted of supply chain managers and senior managers 
(i.e., CEO, Operations director) from the manufacturing sectors in China, as these informants 
are the decision-makers who can assess firm’s strategic information. As the level of industrial 
development varies across different regions, we strategically focus on the Pearl River Delta 
(PDR), which is a well-known highly developed manufacturing region in China. To test the 
model, data were collected through a large-scale email survey. We made two email contacts 
with each of the targeted respondents, including a pre-notice letter and a primary invitation 
letter with an online survey link. A merged contact mail list purchased from a marketing 
company containing contact information of 2440 manufacturing companies in China was 
used.  Before distributing the questionnaires, we screened out the possible target respondents 
in the first stage. The criteria for selecting the sample firms were: (1) selected sample firms 
should have experienced some degree of product recall or withdrawal; (2) they have adopted 
both formal risk and reward sharing practice. The sample size of this study is comparable to 
the prior research in the field of risk management (Zsidisin and Smith, 2005), and the survey 
 
 
 
result from firms that adopt a formal risk and reward sharing approach can be considered 
worthy of trust. Overall, we obtained 200 valid responses representing their individual 
company, equalling an effective response rate of 8.2%. The demographic information of the 
sample firms and their representativeness is presented in Table 2. In addition, a chi-square (X2) 
test was adopted to examine the non-response bias. The insignificant result indicates that there 
is no difference between the response group and non-response group in terms of firm size 
(X2=3.913), degree of freedom (df =2, p=0.141) and the annual revenue (X2=5.803, df =3, 
p=0.122) at the level of 0.1. Thus, non-response bias is not a threat to this study.  
 
Table 2 About Here 
 
4.2 Measurements 
According to the accepted procedures of item generation, the survey items for measuring 
supplier involvement, task programmability and quality performance were identified and 
modified from previous literature. Although there are some previous studies adopting 
questionnaire method to measure risk and reward sharing, most of them used the single-item 
measurements or treated them as one single construct. For example, Min and Mentzer (2004) 
propose simple measurement item - “Our supply chain members share risks and rewards”  to 
measure the level of the adoption of “Risk & Reward Sharing”. This research extends the 
previous works by developing two sets of multiple items to measure the risk and reward sharing 
individually based upon the literature review and related theoretical foundations that were 
presented in the previous section and tend to be conceptual or case-based in nature.  
 
Given that the measurement items of risk and reward sharing in previous research suffer from 
the drawback of being too generic (Min and Mentzer, 2004), we specify that the risk sharing 
mechanism focuses on the quality risks in the supply materials, while the reward sharing 
mechanism concerns the rewards from supply chain cooperation. To evaluate the applicability 
and clarity of the questionnaire, pilot tests were conducted. Five academics and five 
practitioners were carefully selected to assess the content of the questionnaire and the adequacy 
of the research design. It is important to note that, as pointed out by the expert panel, in a real-
world situation it is difficult for practitioners to identify supplier activities that can be rewarded 
for “outstanding performance”, except in the case of product development projects, which can 
be a focus for additional rewards. In response to these comments from the expert panel, the 
 
 
 
reward sharing concept is adjusted to focus on the rewards from product development projects.1 
This adjustment is further supported by the fact that, according to Griffin and Page (1996), a 
failed product development project could result in production and design errors, and ultimately 
to product recall. Therefore, a concept of reward sharing that looks at the product development 
process should be valid.  
 
According to Podsakoff et al. (2003), because this study uses the seven-point Likert scale and 
single informants, it is necessary to consider the potential problem of common method bias 
(CMB). However, the Harman’s one-factor test resulted in six distinct factors and the first 
factor accounted for just 16.011%, which was not the majority of the total variance of 68.547%. 
Therefore, we can claim that CMB is not a threat for this study. Moreover, the confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) for a single factor showed a poor model fit (X2/df = 7.269, CFI = 0.404, 
IFI=0.410, GFI=0.544 and RMSEA = 0.177), which means that the single factor model is not 
acceptable. Therefore, the CMB problem is not a concern.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Construct reliability 
To assess the construct reliability, this study adopted a two-step procedure suggested by 
Narasimhan and Jayaram (1998). In the first step, we applied exploratory factory analysis (EFA) 
to check the unidimensionality of the constructs. The EFA was conducted using the principal 
component method with varimax rotation and without specifying the number of factors. Based 
on the EFA results, we obtained five distinct factors with eigenvalues larger than 1, which 
explain 68.547% of the total variance. The acceptable model fit indices for this six-factor result 
in CFA also support the unidimensionality. Next, composite reliability (pc) was calculated to 
assess the reliability of the seven factors generated from the EFA. According to Hair (2010), 
0.70 is the minimum recommended value for pc. In other words, for those constructs with pc 
greater than 0.7, the reliability is confirmed. As shown in Appendix, all seven pc were above 
0.814, which indicates that the measurements of this study are reliable.  
 
5.2 Convergent and discriminant validity 
To examine the convergent and discriminant validity, this study applied CFA (O'Leary-Kelly 
                                                        
1 The definition of reward sharing is also refined based on the comments of expert panel. 
 
 
 
and Vokurka, 1998). First, the convergent validity was confirmed, because of the acceptable 
measurement model fit and the highly significant factor loadings. Specifically, in the 
measurement model, the comparative fit index (CFI) of 0.937, incremental fit index (IFI) of 
0.938, non-normed fit index (NNFI) of 0.925 and goodness-fit-index (GFI) of 0.885, are all 
above the acceptable values as suggested by Hair et al. (2006). The root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is 0.060, and the value of X2/df (273.049/160) is 1.707, which are 
less than the recommended maximum values of 0.1 and 5 respectively. Therefore, the model 
fit indices as presented above all demonstrate a good fit for the measurement model. Moreover, 
APPENDIX shows that the factor loadings, which range from 0.616 to 0.846, are higher than 
the minimum acceptable value of 0.50 and are all statistically significant (i.e., t-value greater 
than 2.0). Hence, the convergent validity is further supported (Bollen, 1989). In addition, this 
study adopted the average variance extracted (AVE) and inter-construct correlations 
comparison method to assess the discriminant validity. According to Chin (1998), to achieve 
discriminant validity, the square root of AVE for each construct should be greater than its 
correlations with other constructs. All six constructs’ square root of AVE are greater than their 
correlations with other constructs, which means that the discriminant validity is confirmed. The 
detailed discriminant validity results are available from the authors. 
 
5.3 Structural model 
In order to explore the interaction effect between risk and reward sharing with structural 
equation modelling (SEM), this study adopted the method suggested by Li et al. (2010) to 
generate the interaction construct (Hair, 2010). The interaction construct was also added into 
the proposed model and tested simultaneously with other constructs (Li et al., 2010). Using 
AMOS 22, the SEM was run to assess the support of the conceptual model and hypotheses. 
Table 4 presents the results of the structural model, where all the entries are standardised 
regression weight. Although the RMSEA of 0.085 for our structural model is slightly higher 
than the good fit benchmark of 0.08, it is still below the acceptable value of 0.1 (Flynn et al., 
2010). Overall, the fit of the structural model (Table 3) is acceptable.  
 
Table 3 About Here 
  
 
The model was assessed by examining the variance explained (R2) of the endogenous construct 
or dependent variables and the intensity of the path coefficients (β). The maximum value of R2 
 
 
 
is 31% for reward sharing practice and the minimum is 18% for quality performance. H1a and 
H1b hypothesise positive relationships between supplier involvement and risk management 
practice. We find strong support for both H1a and H1b. Risk sharing (β=0.447, t=7.237) and 
reward sharing (β=0.184, t=3.108) are positively impacted by the level of supplier involvement. 
The paths also support the relationships of H2a and H2b. This implies that task programmability 
is a critical predictor of reward sharing (β=0.507, t=8.566) and risk sharing (β=0.184, t=2.974). 
Regarding the impact on quality performance, we find that the reward sharing approach is 
significantly associated with quality performance (β =0.361, t=4.094), supporting H3b, while 
risk sharing is marginally associated with quality performance (β =0.128, t=1.875). In addition, 
the negative impact of interaction between risk and reward sharing on quality performance is 
also marginally significant (β =-0.118, t=-1.822). Thus, the results of our moderating analysis 
reject H4, which predicted that risk and reward sharing have complementary effect on the 
quality performance. This result is surprising and offers a completely different view to that of 
the risk and reward sharing literature. 
 
6. Discussion 
Our results reveal that supplier involvement significantly and positively contributes to risk and 
reward sharing (supporting H1a, H1b). In line with the agency theory, our results support the 
notion that to increase the efficiency of behavioural practices, i.e., risk and reward sharing, 
companies should have a low level of information asymmetry in their supply chain. We also 
find that the effect of supplier involvement on risk sharing is greater than that on reward sharing. 
A possible explanation for this result is that supplier involvement allows buyers to clarify their 
suppliers’ capability, function and performance; thus, the buying firms can more easily design 
and implement effective risk sharing with their suppliers. Birou and Fawcett (1994) argue that 
supplier involvement promotes better resource utilisation, and the sharing of technological 
expertise. Supplier involvement, as a form of vertical cooperation in which manufacturers 
involve suppliers at an early stage in the product development process, could be a foundational 
element for risk and reward sharing practice, transferring faster and more effective information 
of the supplier to the buyer, to establish a more accurate risk and reward sharing program. The 
hypotheses H2a and H2b were both supported, showing significant and positive relationships 
between task programmability and risk and reward sharing. As the other antecedent factor, task 
programmability assists the buying firm to specify the supplier’s production tasks and thereby 
enables the buyer to recognise the strengths and weaknesses of their business partners. 
 
 
 
According to the agency theory, task programmability has significant and positive effect on the 
efficiency of behaviour-based practices (Eisenhardt, 1989). Our finding suggest that the task 
programmability significantly contributes to both risk and reward sharing further supports this 
proposition.  
 
Our findings support the hypothesis that risk sharing practice positively influences firms’ 
quality performance (H3a). This finding is consistent with a recent study conducted by Fan et 
al. (2016), which suggest that the risk sharing mechanism is a significant factor of contributing 
firm’s performance. This practice, designed to share the burden of loss, requires the supplier to 
bear part of the responsibility when unpredictable quality risk occurs. Where a risk sharing 
contract allocates the burden of loss from external product failure cost to both buyers and 
suppliers, the suppliers are motivated to maintain and even improve the manufacturing process 
and quality of product. Hence, risk sharing practice should be pursued to achieve high levels 
of quality performance.  
 
We also find that reward sharing practice has positive impact on quality performance (H3b). 
When the buyer shares the benefits and rewards of product quality improvement with the 
supplier, a goal alignment occurs such that the supplier shares the buyer’s goal to sustain the 
product quality. This research finding contributes to the agency theory literature, supporting 
the view with empirical evidence that reward sharing could be an effective practice to solve 
the agency problems in buyer-supplier relationships, such as goal conflict between buyers and 
suppliers (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). Our research findings support the conceptual argument by 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2008), in which process of sharing benefits amongst the business 
partners can motivate the mutual decision making that is optimal for the overall supply chain 
performance.  
 
The test for H4 yields an unexpected and interesting result. The interaction effect of risk and 
reward sharing is negative. That is, adopting both risk and reward simultaneously weakens 
their positive effect on quality performance. This indicates the existence of a substitution effect 
rather than a complementary effect of risk and reward sharing on quality performance. The 
research findings of the substitution effect suggest that when the incentives of product 
improvement have been clarified, the norms of risk sharing in the supply chain relationship 
may be downplayed but are implicitly embedded in the relationship. This finding implies that 
 
 
 
managers should prioritise the reward sharing practice rather than enhancing the norms of risk 
sharing to improve quality performance. This is an interesting finding in a Chinese context, in 
which Chinese cultural values such as mianzi or face (social capital in the form of social status) 
play important roles in business relationships (Luo, 1997; Jia and Zsidisin, 2014; Jia et al., 
2016). Business people tend to downplay the negative wording in the language used while 
interacting. Risk sharing is seen as negative, threatening and therefore the last resort rather than 
a strategic action by Chinese businessmen.  
 
Another possible explanation is that the reward sharing may eliminate the need for risk sharing. 
The rewards promised in the ex-ante contract (i.e., reward sharing) might counteract the 
benefits achieved from opportunistic behaviour, such as unjustified gains from cutting corners. 
In this case, there is no need for the buyer to adopt a disincentive mechanism (i.e., risk sharing) 
to promote the quality performance, since the supplier does not need to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour to earn the benefits covered by the rewards sharing. In addition, according to the 
nature of the practices, risk sharing aims at demotivating poor performance, while rewards 
sharing aims at motivating above average performance. By providing rewards such as 
economic benefits or the transfer of technical knowledge, buyers can motivate suppliers to 
contribute more innovative or improvement ideas (Yeung et al., 2007). In contrast, risk sharing 
ensures only that the product meets the “bottom-line” quality standard. Therefore, if the reward 
sharing is effective in improving product quality, the effect of the risk sharing might be 
weakened.  
 
7. Conclusions 
At the outset of the paper, we develop two research questions: 1) What are the antecedent 
factors motivating focal companies to adopt risk and reward sharing practices in an effective 
manner? 2) How do risk and reward sharing practices influence focal companies' quality 
performance? 
 
We answer them by developing and testing a model with empirical data from 200 
manufacturers in China. Specifically, we find both risk sharing and reward sharing positively 
affect quality performance individually. In other words, risk and reward sharing reduce the 
quality risk which is inherent in the supply network and eventually could be the means of 
 
 
 
mitigating the threat of product recalls. However, when risk and reward sharing are used 
together, the quality performance is weakened in a Chinese context. We also identify and 
support the existence of two antecedents to risk and reward sharing i.e., task programmability 
and supplier involvement.  
 
Theoretical contributions 
This empirical study yields three important theoretical contributions. First, being anchored in 
a SCP model, this paper explicitly proposes that risk and reward sharing offer an important 
solution to address agency problems. In SCP literature, risk and reward sharing are viewed as 
a pair of key activities that help both buyer and supplier to obtain the mutual benefits in their 
partnership (Lambert et al., 1996). Although the SCP has been found to be a group of excellent 
management practices to improve firm performance, there has been insufficient investigation 
of each key activity within the partnership model, especially for risk and reward sharing. To 
close this gap, we examine the effects of risk and reward sharing in detail. Specifically, 
previous studies provide limited empirical evidence to support the argument that risk and 
reward sharing practice exert an impact on quality performance. This may be one of the first 
studies to provide empirical evidence that both risk and reward sharing positively affect quality 
performance.  
 
Second, given that the empirical research of risk and reward sharing is limited, there is very 
little prior research that has attempted to identify the antecedent factors of risk and reward 
sharing. Although recent research has started to identify the drivers of risk sharing mechanisms 
(e.g., Fan et al., 2017), surprisingly, potential drivers such as supplier involvement and task 
programmability have received limited attention from OM scholars. Additionally, to the best 
of our knowledge, no research has attempted to identify the antecedents of reward sharing. 
Drawing from agency theory, we add to the existing literature by scrutinising the effects of task 
programmability and supplier involvement on risk and reward sharing. This study finds that by 
enhancing the observability of the supplier’s tasks and reducing the information asymmetry 
between the supply chain members, supplier involvement and task programmability positively 
and significantly impact on the risk and reward sharing.  
 
Third, another key finding is that only one of the risk and reward sharing practices should be 
adopted at one time, rather than them being applied simultaneously. Previous researches have 
 
 
 
generally viewed risk and reward sharing as synonymous, or at least as a combined concept, in 
the framework of supply chain collaboration (Lambert et al., 1996). Importantly, several recent 
OM studies have adopted this view to conceptualise both risk and reward sharing in a single 
theoretical construct (Min and Mentzer, 2004; Wiengarten et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2016). 
However, our result for the interaction effect between the risk and reward sharing emphasises 
the need to operationalise the concepts individually.  
 
Practical contributions 
Our theoretical model represents a reasonable initial guide for organisations considering 
implementing programmed tasks and supplier involvement and provides a general framework 
for organisations to utilise when modifying current risk management practice to improve their 
performance. The findings will assist managers to realise the strategic roles of risk and reward 
sharing in improving quality performance. However, this study recommends that managers 
should distinguish the characteristics of risk and reward sharing. This is because our results 
suggest that if they are used together or applied as a bundle, quality performance might be 
weakened.  In addition, to ensure the success of risk and reward sharing, this study highlights 
the need for practitioners to involve suppliers in the early stages of the manufacturing process. 
Drawing from the significant effects of task programmability, we would like to remind 
managers that specifying the level of the suppliers’ tasks determines the comprehensiveness of 
the risk and reward sharing mechanism. 
 
Limitations 
This paper is not exempt from limitations, which need to be considered when interpreting the 
findings and conducting further research. First, a potential limitation of this study is that two 
relationships were only marginally significant (p<0.1), i.e., the effects of risk sharing and 
interaction term on quality performance. Although recent empirical research in OM claims that 
“0.1 level effect” can still be a significant research finding (Marodin et al., 2017; Tamayo-
Torres et al., 2017), we recommend that future research should re-examine the underlying 
effects using a larger sample to increase the statistical power. Second, size of the sampled firms 
is unbalanced. A large proportion of data from small or medium-sized companies resulted in 
limited information content, which only reflects the existing performance in a certain small 
group. In contrast to small or medium enterprises, large scale enterprises possessing more 
resources can more easily attract their supplier firms to be involved in the early manufacturing 
 
 
 
process and conduct task programmability. Such differences impact the effectiveness of risk 
sharing and reward sharing practice, which in turn affect firm performance. Third, this research 
focuses only on China. Since different countries have different views on risk management 
practice, this also affects the result. In view of these limitations, it is recommended that the 
survey should be replicated in large or well-developed companies in a range of countries and 
industries.  
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Authors Measurements – Risk / 
Reward Sharing 
Definition or 
Description of Risk / 
Reward Sharing 
Method Key Findings 
Lee and Kim (1999) Two question items 
were adopted to 
measure both risk and 
reward sharing. 
Degree of articulation 
and agreement on 
benefit and risk between 
partners. 
Survey Risk and reward sharing 
have significant positive 
impact on outsourcing 
success, business 
success and user 
success.   
Matopoulos et al. (2007) Not specified The balance of risk and 
reward sharing is a 
critical factor that guides 
companies toward close 
collaboration. 
Case study The proposition that 
power asymmetry 
amplifies the imbalance 
of risk-benefit sharing 
among partnering 
companies is rejected.  
Min and Mentzer (2004) Three question items 
were adopted to 
measure both risk and 
reward sharing. 
Effective SCM requires 
mutually sharing risk 
and rewards that 
generate a competitive 
advantage. 
Survey Risk and reward sharing 
is a first order factor of 
SCM that positively 
impacts on firm 
performance. 
Li et al. (2015) Five question items were 
adopted to measure risk 
sharing mechanism. 
Risk sharing mechanism 
refers to the situation in 
which supply chain 
members use more 
formal policies and 
arrangements (e.g., 
agreements and 
contracts) to share the 
obligations and 
responsibilities in 
Survey The positive effect of 
risk sharing mechanism 
on financial performance 
is significant. Shared 
SCRM understanding 
positively moderates the 
effect of risk sharing 
mechanism on financial 
performance. 
 
 
 
activities and/or 
resources relating to 
supply chain risk 
management (SCRM). 
Fan et al. (2016) Five question items were 
adopted to measure risk 
sharing mechanism. 
Risk sharing mechanism 
refers to the formal 
policies and 
arrangements (e.g., 
agreements and 
contracts) through 
which supply chain 
partners share the 
obligations and duties 
for mitigating SCRs and 
dealing with the 
consequences of the 
SCRs in their supply 
chains. 
Survey 1. Risk information 
sharing and risk analysis 
and assessment are two 
significant drivers of risk 
sharing mechanism.  
2. Firm’s operational 
performance is 
positively influenced by 
the risk sharing 
mechanism. 
Wiengarten et al. (2010) Three question items 
were adopted to 
measure the incentive 
alignment mechanism 
(or risk and reward 
sharing). 
The degree to which 
supply chain members 
share costs, risks and 
benefits. 
Survey The incentive alignment 
positively impacts on the 
operational 
performance. The 
incentive alignment has 
a stronger positive effect 
on operational 
performance when the 
exchanged information 
is characterised by high 
quality.  
Zhang and Cao (2018) Four question items 
were adopted to 
The process by which 
supply chain partners 
Survey 1. The incentive 
alignment is a first order 
 
 
 
measure the incentive 
alignment mechanism 
(or risk and reward 
sharing). 
share costs, risks, and 
benefits. It includes 
determining costs, risks, 
and benefits as well as 
developing incentive 
schemes. 
factor of supply chain 
collaboration, which is 
operationalised as a 
second order factor.  
2. IOS appropriation and 
collaborative culture are 
the significant drivers of 
supply chain 
collaboration. 
Table 1. Key Studies of Risk and Reward Sharing 
  
 
 
 
Classification N Percentage 
Supply Chain Position   
Downstream (close to customer) 72 36.0% 
Midstream 79 39.5% 
Upstream (close to supplier) 49 24.5% 
Number of Employees   
<50 61 30.5% 
50-200 68 34% 
>201 71 35.5% 
Annual Revenue   
<RMB10 million 60 30.0% 
>RMB10 million-RMB50 
million 
81 40.5% 
>RMB50 million-RMB200 
million 
32 16.0% 
>RMB200 million 27 13.5% 
Industry Sectors   
Electronic/electrical 102 51% 
Fabrics, Clothing and its 
alternatives 
15 7.5% 
Plastic and Rubber Products 41 20.5% 
Furniture 34 17% 
Others 8 4% 
Table 2. Company Profile 
 
  
 
 
 
 Risk Sharing Reward Sharing Quality Performance 
Independent Variables 
Task Programmability 0.184*** 0.507***  
Supplier Involvement 0.447*** 0.184***  
Risk Sharing (RIS)   0.128* 
Reward Sharing (RES)   0.263*** 
Interaction (RIS*RES) 
i.e. Complementary effects 
  -0.118* 
Model Fitness 
Chi-square/d.f. 2.453 
p-value 0.012 
CFI 0.941 
GFI 0.977 
RMSEA 0.085 
IFI 0.947 
The entries in the table are standardised path coefficients. 
*p<0.1 
**p<0.05 
***p<0.01 
Table 3. The results of the structural model 
 
Appendix: Measurement scales and loadings 
The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the 
below statements as applicable to their firm: (1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree) 
 
 Factor 
Loading 
Reference 
Supplier Involvement (pc =0.866; AVE=0.619) 
SIN1 We often communicate with suppliers about quality 
considerations and design changes. 
0.795 (Primo and 
Amundson, 
2002) SIN2 We develop a good cooperative relationship with 
suppliers. 
0.735 
SIN3 The company strives to establish long-term 
relationships with suppliers. 
0.845 
SIN4 The supplier often provides a lot of input in the new 
product development (NPD) process. 
 
0.767 
Task Programmability (pc =0.814; AVE=0.525) 
TP1 My company invests capital to suppliers and jointly 
designs the production process to improve suppliers’ 
product quality. 
0.671 (Camuffo et 
al., 2007; 
Zsidisin and 
Ellram, 
2003) 
TP2 In order to ensure products meet standard requirements, 
my company always specifies the individual tasks. 
0.800 
TP3 My company always cooperates with suppliers to 
establish task programmability. 
0.795 
TP4 In order to monitor suppliers’ product quality, we 
always request that suppliers provide information 
related to product quality such as error rate, defect rate 
and SPC. 
0.615 
Risk Sharing (pc =0.850; AVE=0.654) 
RIS1 When there are any problems in the supply materials (or 0.770 (Camuffo et 
 
 
 
product), our company and suppliers will cooperate 
with each other to tackle the issue. 
al., 2007; 
Mentzer et 
al., 2001) RIS2 When there are any problems in the supply materials (or 
product), our company and suppliers will cooperate 
with each other to share the related costs. 
0.830 
RIS3 When there are any problems in the supply materials (or 
product), our company and supplier will mutually bear 
the responsibility.  
 
0.825 
Reward Sharing (pc =0.821; AVE=0.535) 
RES1 With regard to product development, our company and 
suppliers always share the rewards with each other, 
hence achieve cost minimisation. 
0.748 (Bindemann, 
1999; 
Giannoccaro 
and 
Pontrandolfo
, 2004; 
Yeung et al., 
2007; Zirpoli 
and Caputo, 
2002) 
RES2 Our company and suppliers always share the 
cooperation rewards. 
0.706 
RES3 Our company has an effective document that clearly 
states the rewards for each party when there are 
economic benefits earned from product development. 
0.702 
RES4 Our company has specified in the commercial 
agreement various rewards that will be shared with 
suppliers (such as the new knowledge of product 
development to supplier). 
 
0.767 
Quality Performance (pc =0.851; AVE=0.535) 
QP1 With regard to product reliability, my company’s 
product achieves higher customer satisfaction when 
compared to our competitors’. 
0.815 (Kristal et 
al., 2010) 
QP2 With regard to product safety, my company’s product 
achieves higher customer satisfaction when compared 
to our competitors’ products. 
0.799 
QP3 With regard to product durability, my company’s 
product achieves higher customer satisfaction when 
compared to our competitors’. 
0.723 
QP4 The number of complaints regarding our product has 
been decreasing over the last three years. 
0.651 
QP5 The number of product litigation claims has been 
decreasing over the last three years. 
0.651 
 
 
 
 
